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We present an unconditionally secure quantum bit com-
mitment protocol based on three linearly dependent quantum
states. Its security is guaranteed by the quantum superposi-
tion principle.
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Exploring the frontier of a physical eld is of special
interest to physicist and of crucial importance to human
society. For example, perpetual motion machine and su-
perluminal communication are forbidden by the classical
mechanics and special relativity, respectively. In quan-
tum cryptography [1{3], a question is often mentioned:
what tasks can be carried out securely according to the
principle of quantum mechanics, and what cannot?
Generally, the quantum key distribution (QKD) is be-
lieved to be secure [4,5] based on the no-cloning theorem
[6]. At rst, various other protocols, e.g., quantum bit
commitment (QBC) and coin tossing, had also been pro-
posed [1,7{9]. Among all kinds of quantum cryptography
protocols, QBC protocol is a crucial primitive to build
up more sophisticated protocols, such as remote quan-
tum gambling [10], coin tossing [1,8,9], quantum oblivi-
ous transfer [7,11,12] and hence unconditionally secure
two-party quantum computations [13], etc. However,
Mayers [14], Lo and Chau [15,16] argued that all the
previous QBC protocols [1,7{9] are insecure, because in
those protocols, there is no way to prevent an Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) attack or cheating strategy. Nev-
ertheless, the Mayers-Lo-Chau theorem does not prohibit
any QBC protocol. Up to now, it is still often debated
whether there exists an unconditionally secure QBC pro-
tocol [17{19].
In a bit commitment scheme, usually two parties are
involved, a sender, Alice and a receiver, Bob. Generally, a
commitment process can be divided into two procedures:
commit and unveil. In the committing stage, Alice, pro-
vides Bob with a piece of evidence (committing system)
that he has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to
him. In the unveiling stage, it must be possible for Al-
ice to open the commitment (with the unveiling system),
that is, Alice must be able to show Bob which bit she has
committed to and convince him that this is indeed the
genuine bit she chose during the committing stage.
A bit commitment protocol is regarded as uncondition-
ally secure under the conditions of binding and conceal-
ing [14]. The bit b should be binding, i.e., Alice should
not be able to change it after the committing stage. If
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it is changed, Bob should be able to detect the cheating
with probability 1, if not, Bob should be able to get the
bit b perfectly in the unveiling stage. While the piece of
evidence should be concealing, i.e., Bob should not be
able to tell from it what the bit b is before the unveiling
stage. Otherwise, either Alice or Bob would be able to
cheat successfully.
A perfectly secure QBC protocol is impossible due to
the EPR attack [14{16], then what about the nonideal
QBC? Consider a protocol with some security parameter
N , it is concealing (binding) if it can be made arbitrarily
close to perfectly concealing (binding) with the increase
of N . A protocol with parameter N is secure if it is bind-
ing when Bob is honest and concealing when Alice is hon-
est. A protocol is said to be unconditionally secure if it
is secure against a cheater with unlimited computational
power. In quantum cryptography, we want uncondition-
ally secure protocols, that does not mean that we want
perfectly secure (ideal) protocols [14].
A concrete example of an implementation of bit com-
mitment is for Alice to write down the bit on a piece of
paper which is then locked in a safe to be given to Bob,
while keeping for herself the safe key that can be pre-
sented later to open the commitment. In this method,
it is reasonable that Alice cannot change the bit after
the committing stage, however Bob may be able to know
the bit before the unveiling stage, such as by picking the
lock to open the safe, etc. In other words, this method
succeeds in binding condition, but fails in concealing con-
dition. (Note that Kent has proposed secure classical bit
commitment protocols based on special relativity [20].)
In order to conceal the piece of evidence, most of the
previous QBC protocols [1,7{9] are based on comple-
mentarity [21], which asserts: A quantum system (the
committing system) can display both wavelike behavior
(interference, the coherence of superposition state) and
particlelike behavior (the system in its eigenstate), but
it is impossible to obtain both interference and complete
\Welcher-Weg" (which-eigenstate, i.e., which-path) in-
formation in a single experiment. In those protocols, dif-
ferent values of bit b are represented by dierent kinds of
coherence of the committing system. Alice accomplishes
the concealing by extracting the which-path information
completely (destroying the coherence totally). To open
the commitment, Alice resorts to quantum erasure [22]
(erasing the which-path information and recovering the
coherence). However in quantum erasure, the which-path
detector may be a quantum system, dierent measure-
ment strategies of the detector result in dierent inter-
ference patterns, that is just the EPR attack.
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From the above discussion, to prevent the EPR attack,
there must remain some dierent kinds of coherence in
the committing system for dierent values of bit b. How-
ever, according to the concealing condition, this dier-
ence should not be distinguished by Bob without the un-
veiling system. In the present Letter, we show that these
conditions can be fullled within quantum mechanics. In
other words, there exist unconditionally secure QBC pro-
tocols.
For convenience, our QBC protocol is based on entan-
gled states, which has been a fundamental resources of
various quantum information processing, such as telepor-
tation [23], dense coding [24], QKD [2,25], authentication
[26] and computation [27], etc.
Here we concentrate on the 2  2 systems (entangled
qubits), which has been successfully produced in labora-
tory [28]. Three linearly dependent states are involved:
two signal states and one blank state. The signal states
are essential to represent dierent values of bit b, while
the blank state is required for concealing, which serves as
noise. In the present protocol, the signal states are two
orthogonal product states
ji = j00iuc ; j i = j11iuc ; (1)
which respectively correspond to b = 0 and 1. The sub-
script u and c in Equation (1) denote the unveiling and
committing particles, respectively. While the blank state
is the superposition of ji and j i , i.e., a Bell state
ji = 1=
p
2 (j00iuc + j11iuc) : (2)
The corresponding local density operators of the commit-
ting particle are
 () = j0i h0j ; ( ) = j1i h1j ;
 () = 1=2(j0i h0j+ j1i h1j): (3)
In this protocol, Alice prepares N pairs of particles,
only a small portion of which, say γN pairs are in the
same signal states, ji (b = 0) or j i (b = 1), where γ is
a positive factor depending on N to be determined later,
meanwhile the other N−γN pairs are in the blank state.
During the committing stage, Alice sends the N commit-
ting particles to Bob in a random sequence. Then Bob
keeps the committing particles and Alice writes down
the sequence information. During the unveiling stage,
Alice announces the bit value she committed to together
with the sequence information of the committing parti-
cles and sends the corresponding N unveiling particles to
Bob one by one. Bob makes corresponding pairwise col-
lective measurement on the N pairs of particles to check
whether Alice is cheat or not. Thus, in this protocol, the
committing system is the N committing particles, while
the unveiling system is the corresponding N unveiling
particles and the classical information of the sequence
for sending the committing particles.
The complete procedure of the QBC scheme may be
expressed as following [15]:
(1) Alice chooses the value of a bit b she will commit
to Bob and prepares a corresponding state of an auxil-
iary system, introduced to index the classical sequence






i=1 jhii jii ; M = CγNN ; (4a)
where hhij hji = ij and jii’s denote dierent per-
mutations of the N pairs of particles, for example,
j1i = ji⊗γN ⊗ ji⊗(1−γ)N ; j2i = ji ⊗ ji⊗γN ⊗
ji⊗(N−γN−1), etc. Obviously, the total number of jii’s






h0j jΨji ; (4b)
where hh0ij h0j

= ij and jΨji’s are corresponding to dif-
ferent permutations of the N pairs of particles, for exam-
ple, jΨ1i = j i⊗γN ⊗ji⊗(1−γ)N ; jΨ2i = ji⊗j i⊗γN ⊗
ji⊗(N−γN−1), etc. The total number of jΨji’s is M . It
can be easily deduced that
hij Ψji = (1=2)γN (5a)
if the positions of the signal particles in jii and jΨji are
not overlapped, otherwise
hij Ψji = 0: (5b)
In other words, the states belonging to dierent sets of
fjiig and fjΨjig are nearly orthogonal, and this guar-
antees Bob to get the bit b perfectly of an honest Alice
and nd out the cheating of a dishonest Alice.
The relationship between the bases fjhiig and
h0j}of
the auxiliary system will be discussed later. Both Alice
and Bob are supposed to know the states j0ib and j1ib.
They may choose nonequally superposed states to denote
j0ib and j1ib, but that will degrade the security of the
protocol.
(2) An honest Alice makes a measurement on the aux-
iliary system to determine the value of i if b = 0 (j if
b = 1).
(3) Alice sends the N committing particles to Bob as
a piece of evidence for her commitment.
(4) At a later time, Alice opens the commitment by
declaring the value of b and of i or j and by sending Bob
the N unveiling particles.
(5) Bob performs collective measurements, which are
within the reach of current technology, on every pair of
entangled qubits to verify that Alice has indeed commit-
ted to the genuine bit. More precisely, the classical infor-
mation from Alice (the value of b and also i or j) should
be coincident with Bob’s measurement result. For exam-
ple, if b = 0; i = 1, then the rst γN pairs of particles
should be found in state ji, others should be found in
state ji. If such expected coincidence do appear, Bob
accepts that Alice is honest. Otherwise, Bob suspects
that Alice is cheating.
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The proof of security of this QBC protocol is as follows:
Concealing: We now show that in the present proto-
col, the probability that Bob can discriminate j0ib andj1ib before the unveiling stage tends to zero by an in-
crease of N .
Without the knowledge of i and j, the local density
operator at Bob’s side (the committing system) of j0ib
and j1ib are




i=1 i (0) ;




j=1 j (1) ;
(6)
where i (0) and j (1) are the local density oper-
ator of jii and jΨji, respectively. For example,
1 (0) =  ()
⊗γN ⊗  ()⊗(1−γ)N , 1 (1) = ( )⊗γN ⊗
 ()⊗(1−γ)N , etc. We adopt the trace norm distance [29]
d(1; 2) Trj1 − 2j to describe the dierence between
 (0) and  (1) and get





CiN−γN − CN−iN−γN  ; (7)
which can be taken as the unoverlapped area of two dis-
tributions
D1 = 12N−γN C
i
N−γN ; i = 0; 1; :::; N;
D2 = 12N−γN C
N−j
N−γN ; j = 0; 1; :::; N:
(8)
With the help of this description, it can be easily obtained







(1 − γ) ; (9)
where the last approximation is according to Stirling for-
mula. If we set γ = N−
3
4 , then we have





Obviously, with the increase of parameterN , the distance
vanishes and therefore the probability for Bob to know
the value of bit b before the unveiling stage tends to zero
in this protocol. Up to now, we have nished the proof
of the concealing condition.
Binding: Obviously, if Alice is honest, Bob is able
to get the bit b perfectly in the unveiling stage, because
jii and jΨji are nearly orthogonal. Next, we prove that
if Alice change the value of bit b after the committing
stage, the probability for her to pass Bob’s verication
tends to zero with the increase of parameter N .











k jekic ⊗ jekiu jgki ;
(11)
where jeki’s are the eigenvectors of the reduced den-
sity operators  (0) and  (1) of the committing sys-
tem, which are the product states of fj0i ; j1ig in the
2⊗N -dimensional Hilbert space. Whereas k and k are
respectively the corresponding eigenvalues of  (0) and
 (1), jfki and jgki denote the corresponding states of
the auxiliary system in the M -dimensional Hilbert space.
From Eqs. (4) and (11), we know that jfki (jgki) is the
superposition states of fjhiig
(h0j} and that the un-
veiling and committing particles are correlated.
We have shown in Eq. (10) that the probability for
Bob to distinguish between  (0) and  (1) tends to zero
with the increase of N , which means that [30]
F ( (0) ;  (1))  [1− 0:5d( (0) ;  (1))]2 ! 1; (12)
where the delity [31] F (1; 2) 
Trpp12p12.
Without loss of generality, we suppose that Alice
chooses b = 0 in her mind initially and prepares the cor-
responding state j0ib. If Alice wants to change her mind,






k jekic ⊗ jekiu jgki ; (13)
via unilateral operations such that [31]
jb h00j 1ibj2 = F ( (0) ;  (1)) ! 1 (14)
and pretend that the total state she prepared is j1ib. Ob-
viously, Alicer’s operation,
U jfki = jgki ; (15)
is only on the auxiliary system, the reason lies in that any
operation on the unveiling particles will destroy the cor-
relations between the unveiling and committing particles
and consequently degrade the delity [31].
Indeed, just as Mayers [14], Lo and Chau [15,16] have
pointed out it may be dicult for Bob to distinguish be-
tween j00ib and j1ib, but this does not means that Alice
can cheat successfully with a very large probability. The
key point is that what Bob should distinguish is not j0ib
and j1ib but jii and jΨji. In the unveiling stage, a
cheating Alice should not only announce b = 1 and pro-
vide Bob with the unveiling particles but also declare the
value of j, thus Bob will accordingly detect whether the
particles are really in state jΨji with pairwise collective
measurement.
For the reason mentioned above, we only consider Al-
ice’s operations on the auxiliary system, but we may not
conne her strategy to the denite operation of Eq. (15).
In general, these operations prepare the committing and
unveiling particles in the superposition or mixed states
of fjiig. Without loss of generality, we suppose Alice
declare that j = 1, i.e., she admit that the particles are
in the state jΨ1i = j i⊗γN ⊗ ji⊗(1−γ)N . If Alice gener-









then according to Eqs. (5), the success probability of her
cheating is
P  hΨ1j 00(0) jΨ1i  (1=2)2γN : (16)
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Secondly, she may generate a superposition state j00i =
 jai+  jbi with jj2 + jj2 = 1, where the two terms
are divided according to Eqs. (5), that is, jai is the
superpositions of the jii’s that satisfying hij Ψ1i =
(1=2)γN while jbi is the superpositions of the jii’s
satisfying hij Ψ1i = 0. Obviously, for jai the rst
γN particle pairs should be in state ji, i.e., jai =
ji⊗γN⊗jQi, where jQi is a state of the last (1−γ)N par-
ticle pairs, while for jbi, we have hbj Ψ1i = 0. There-
fore the success probability in this case is
P  jh00j Ψ1ij2 (17)
=
 hQj i⊗(1−γ)N 2 (1=2)γN < (1=2)γN :
In both cases, the success probabilities for Alice’s cheat-
ing tend to zero with the increase of N with the setting of
γ = N−
3
4 . For the general case (POVM measurement),
we can consider the problem in a similar way and still
come to the conclusion that the success probability for
Alice’s cheating P < (1=2)N
1=4
, which tends to zero with
the increase of N . Thus the binding condition is proved
too.
We may give a brief discussion. Two elements are
found to be essential to this protocol, the blank state
and the classical sequence information for Alice to send
the committing particles. The blank state, as a super-
position of the two signal states, can conceal the sig-
nals just as noise does before the unveiling stage. Of
course, that is impossible in classical information pro-
cessing. While in the unveiling stage, the sequence infor-
mation can help to distinguish the signal and blank states
such that to amplify the signal. Although we adopt en-
tangled state for simplicity in the protocol, entanglement
may not be essential for QBC. We conjecture that any
three linearly dependent states, such as j0i, j1i (signal
states) and 1=
p
2 (j0i+ j1i) (blank state), may be enough
to construct an unconditionally secure QBC protocol in
a similar way.
In conclusion, we have shown that there exists uncon-
ditionally secure QBC protocol based on quantum su-
perposition principle. It should be emphasized that be-
cause QBC is a primitive of quantum cryptography, this
QBC protocol can be applied to construct more sophisti-
cated unconditionally secure quantum cryptography pro-
tocols, such as remote quantum gambling, coin tossing,
two-party quantum computations, etc.
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